The COVID-19 pandemic crisis has necessitated widespread adaptation of revised treatment regimens for both urgent and routine medical problems in patients with and without COVID-19. Some of these alternative treatments maybe second-best. Treatments that are known to be superior might not be appropriate to deliver during a pandemic when consideration must be given to distributive justice and protection of patients and their medical teams as well the importance given to individual benefit and autonomy. What is required of the doctor discussing (...) these alternative, potentially inferior treatments and seeking consent to proceed? Should doctors share information about unavailable but standard treatment alternatives when seeking consent? There are arguments in defence of non-disclosure; information about unavailable treatments may not aid a patient to weigh up options that are available to them. There might be justified concern about distress for patients who are informed that they are receiving second-best therapies. However, we argue that doctors should tailor information according to the needs of the individual patient. For most patients that will include a nuanced discussion about treatments that would be considered in other times but currently unavailable. That will sometimes be a difficult conversation, and require clinicians to be frank about limited resources and necessary rationing. However, transparency and honesty will usually be the best policy. (shrink)

Debates about new technologies, such as crop and food genetic modification, raise pressing questions about the ways ‘experts’ and ‘ nonexperts’ communicate. These debates are dynamic, characterized by many voices contesting numerous storylines. The discoursal features, including language choices and communication strategies, of the GM debate are in some ways taken for granted and in others actively manipulated by participants. Although there are many voices, some have more influence than others. This study makes use of 50 hours of in-depth interviews (...) with GM scientists, nonexperts, and other stakeholders in the GM debate to examine this phenomenon. We uncover rhetorical devices used by scientists to characterize and ultimately undermine participation by non-experts in areas including rationality, knowledge, understanding and objectivity. Scientists engage with ‘the public’ from their own linguistic and social domain, without reflexive confirmation of their own status as part of the public and the citizenry. This raises a number of interesting ironies and contradictions, which are explored in the article. As such, it provides valuable insights into an increasingly important type of discourse. (shrink)

This article reports the findings of a one-year project examining British press coverage of the genetically modified food debate during the first half of 2003, and both expert and non-expert reactions to that coverage. Two pro-GM newspapers and two anti-GM newspapers were selected for analysis, and all articles mentioning GM during the period in question were stored in a machine readable database. This was then analyzed using corpus linguistic and discourse analytic techniques to reveal recurrent wording, themes and content. This (...) text analysis was complemented by 12 interviews with experts involved in the communication of GM issues, and 12 focus-group sessions in which members of the public reacted to selected newspaper texts and other GM material. Both in the press and in public reaction, the issue of GM was found to be intimately associated with other political events of the time, notably the invasion of Iraq. Except among experts, there was little awareness of the official national debate and issues were approached in more general terms. Pro-GM characterization of the issues as primarily scientific, both by newspapers and experts, was rejected by the anti-GM press and campaigners, and by the focus-group participants. They assessed the issues in a more global frame, rejecting scientists and companies as unreliable. In addition, they linked both US and British GM policy to the invasion of Iraq, and, by analogy, rejected pro-GM arguments as untrustworthy. (shrink)

A comment on “Editorial 37” Content Type Journal Article Pages 93-95 DOI 10.1007/s10698-011-9110-4 Authors Brian T. Sutcliffe, Laboratoire de Chimie quantique et Photophysique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, B-1050 Bruxelles, Belgium R. Guy Woolley, School of Biomedical and Natural Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, NG11 8NS UK Journal Foundations of Chemistry Online ISSN 1572-8463 Print ISSN 1386-4238 Journal Volume Volume 13 Journal Issue Volume 13, Number 2.

Human neural and behavioral activities have been reported to exhibit fractal dynamics known as 1/f noise, which is more aptly named 1/f scaling. Some argue that 1/f scaling is a general and pervasive property of the dynamical substrate from which cognitive functions are formed. Others argue that it is an idiosyncratic property of domain‐specific processes. An experiment was conducted to investigate whether 1/f scaling pervades the intrinsic fluctuations of a spoken word. Ten participants each repeated the word bucket over 1,000 (...) times, and fluctuations in acoustic measurements across repetitions generally followed the 1/f scaling relation, including numerous parallel yet distinct series of 1/f fluctuations. On the basis of work showing that 1/f scaling is a universal earmark of metastability, it is proposed that the observed pervasiveness of 1/f fluctuations in speech reflects the fact that cognitive functions are formed as metastable patterns of activity in brain, body, and environment. (shrink)

T cells develop in the thymus by expressing a diverse repertoire of either αβ‐ or γδ‐T cell receptors (TCR). While many studies have elucidated how TCR signaling and gene expression control T cell ontogeny, the role of nutrient metabolism is just emerging. Here, we discuss how metabolic reprogramming and nutrient availability impact the fate of developing thymic T cells. We focus on how the PI3K/mTOR signaling mediates various extracellular inputs and how this signaling pathway controls metabolic rewiring during highly proliferative (...) and anabolic developmental stages. We highlight the role of the hexosamine biosynthetic pathway that generates metabolites that are utilized for N‐ and O‐linked glycosylation of proteins and how it impacts TCR expression during T cell ontogeny. We consider the dichotomy in metabolic needs during αβ‐ versus γδ‐T cell lineage commitment as well as how metabolism is also coupled to molecular signaling that controls cell fate. (shrink)

The possibility that nothing really matters can cause much anxiety, but what would it mean for that to be true? Since it couldn’t be bad that nothing matters, fearing nihilism makes little sense. However, the consequences of belief in nihilism will be far more dramatic than often thought. Many metaethicists assume that even if nothing matters, we should, and would, go on more or less as before. But if nihilism is true in an unqualified way, it can’t be the case (...) that we should go on as before. And given some plausible assumptions about our psychology, it’s also unlikely that we would go on as before: belief in nihilism will lead to loss of evaluative belief, and that will lead to loss or deflation of our corresponding subjective concerns. Now if nothing matters, then this consequence also wouldn’t matter. But this consequence will be extremely harmful if we believe in nihilism but things do matter, an asymmetry that gives us, in Pascalian fashion, pragmatic reasons not to believe in nihilism, and reasons not to try to find out whether it is really true. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with objections to theism that revolve around prudential considerations. The prospects of prudential arguments that aim to show that God doesn't exist seem to me dim. But I consider whether prudential considerations can give us pragmatic reasons for not believing that God exists. I also consider how prudential considerations can figure in debunking arguments against theist belief. I then turn to the question of whether we should want God to exist. In answering this question, I consider (...) a further kind of prudential argument – an argument that moves from claims about what would follow from God's existence or nonexistence, to prudential conclusions. In particular, I consider axiological arguments purporting to show that God's existence would make our lives worse. I end by briefly considering questions relating to nihilism, meaning, and significance. (shrink)

Moral case deliberation (MCD) is a specific form of clinical ethics, aiming to stimulate ethical reflection in daily practice in order to improve the quality of care. This article focuses on the implementation of MCD in nursing homes and the questions how and where to organize MCD. The purpose of this study was to evaluate one way of organizing MCD in two Dutch nursing homes. In both of these nursing homes the MCD groups had a heterogeneous composition and were organized (...) apart from existing institutional communication structures. As part of a naturalistic evaluation, systematic observations, interviews and focus groups were completed. The findings indicate that the heterogeneous composition and MCD meetings separate from existing structures have benefits. However, the participants also reported negative experiences. This gives rise to the question whether a mixed MCD group which meets separately is an effective way to embed MCD as an instrument for reflection on moral issues in daily practice. We conclude that there is no single answer to that question. In the end, the two implementation strategies (i.e. within existing communication structures and a mixed MCD group) can be complementary to each other. (shrink)

argumentation, as originally defined by Dung, is a model that allows the description of certain information about arguments and relationships between them: in an abstract argumentation framework, the agent knows for sure whether a given argument or attack exists. It means that the absence of an attack between two arguments can be interpreted as “we know that the first argument does not attack the second one”. But the question of uncertainty in abstract argumentation has received much attention in the last (...) years. In this paper, we survey approaches that allow to express information like “There may be an attack between these arguments”. We describe the main models that incorporate qualitative uncertainty in abstract argumentation, as well as some applications of these models. We also highlight some open questions that deserve some attention in the future. (shrink)

“Objectivity” is an important theoretical concept with diverse applications in our collective practices of inquiry. It is also a concept attended in recent decades by vigorous debate, debate that includes but is not restricted to scientists and philosophers. The special authority of science as a source of knowledge of the natural and social world has been a matter of much controversy. In part because the authority of science is supposed to result from the objectivity of its methods and results, objectivity (...) has been described as an “essentially contested,” and even an “embattled” concept. The concept of objectivity has important but contested applications outside of scientific practices as well. Philosophers, psychologists, and theologians debate whether there is an objective basis for ethical claims and demands. Legal scholars debate what it would mean for laws to be objectively derivable from basic assumptions about justice and equality. One aim of this book is to guide readers through the often volatile debates over the nature and value of objectivity. Another aim is to contribute to that debate through articulating the domain-variance of norms of objectivity, and their different functions for inquirers. A better understanding of the underdetermination problem, and of the many ways that "epistemic" and "social" values rub shoulders in the course of inquiry, aids the development of my pragmatic pluralist account of objectivity. (shrink)

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti-theism. I explain how (...) such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti-theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti-theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti-theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge. (shrink)

Some disability activists argue that disability is merely a difference. It is often objected that this view has unacceptable implications, implying, for example, that it is permissible to cause disability. In reply, Elizabeth Barnes argues that viewing disability as a difference needn’t entail such implications and that seeing such implications as unacceptable is question-begging. We argue that Barnes misconstrues this objection to the mere difference view of disability: it’s not question-begging to regard its implications as unacceptable, and the grounds that (...) Barnes offers for potentially blocking some of these implications fail to explain our conviction that it’s impermissible to cause disability. (shrink)

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

Leibniz comprenait la question pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutot que rien? sur un mode ontologique; il l'interpretait dans le cadre d'une physique continue, lineaire et necessaire; et il y repondait en invoquant le principe de raison suffisante. Nous comprenons desormais cette question sur un mode non ontologique, en substituant une notion relativiste et pragmatiste de realite a la notion absolue d'etre; nous l'interpretons dans le cadre d'une physique discontinue, non lineaire et probabiliste; et nous y repondons en denoncant, sur (...) un mode non sceptique, le principe de raison suffisante. Operer un tel renversement de l'analyse leibnizienne ne suffit toutefois pas. Car nous restons dans le cadre de la logique binaire adoptee par Leibniz, a savoir l'opposition entre le quelque chose (1) et le rien (0)... (shrink)

Chapter 3 surveys objectivity in the natural sciences. Thomas Kuhn problematized the logicist understanding of the objectivity or rationality of scientific change, providing a very different picture than that of the cumulative or step-wise progress of theoretical science. Theories often compete, and when consensus builds around one competitor it may be for a variety of reasons other than just the direct logical implications of experimental successes and failures. Kuhn pitted the study of the actual history of science against what Hans (...) Reichenbach referred to as the “logical substitutes” logicists used to reconstruct the rationality of theory change. Such substitutes were promoted to show that theory confirmation is a purely epistemic affair, where purely epistemic implies purely inferential. But where the positivists saw logical compulsion as the reason for theory change, Kuhn saw psychology in values as relevant to how theories are actually confirmed or accepted by the scientific community. (shrink)

Many believe that severe intellectual impairment, blindness or dying young amount to serious harm and disadvantage. It is also increasingly denied that it matters, from a moral point of view, whether something is biologically normal to humans. We show that these two claims are in serious tension. It is hard explain how, if we do not ascribe some deep moral significance to human nature or biological normality, we could distinguish severe intellectual impairment or blindness from the vast list of seemingly (...) innocent ways in which we fail to have as much wellbeing as we could, such not having super-intelligence, or not living to 130. We consider a range of attempts to draw this intuitive normative distinction without appealing to normality. These, we argue, all fail. But this doesn't mean that we cannot draw this distinction or that we must, implausibly, conclude that biological normality does possess an inherent moral importance. We argue that, despite appearances, it is not biological normality but rather statistical normality that, although lacking any intrinsic moral significance, nevertheless makes an important moral difference in ways that explain and largely justify the intuitive distinction. (shrink)

Foucault considérait l'auteur comme un principe de raréfaction des discours empêchant le livre de mener sa propre existence. Mais, à propos de son oeuvre et à partir d'une certaine époque, il adopte la posture de l'auteur. Pourquoi, donc, l'apologie de la dispersion textuelle s'efface-t-elle au profit de la maîtrise unificatrice du discours? Répondre à cette question oblige à approfondir certaines notions maîtresses de la pensée de Foucault, en particulier le sujet, la vérité et le pouvoir, ainsi que leur articulation.

"J'aime ce livre" serait une proposition insignifiante. L'artiste: un prétexte. On en parle, certes, mais dans une perspective de déconstruction. L'art, donc, plutôt comme expression de la vie. Et la vie comme art de la fuite révolutionnaire. Certains auteurs sont cités à satiété, certains passages sont repris textuellement, répétion aussi des mêmes thèmes, des mêmes expressions. Et une impasse fondamentale. "J'aime ce livre est en effet une proposition insignifiante.Tout propos portant sur le passé, dire "je t'aime", c'est dire qu'en ce (...) moment je ne t'aime pas. Mais si aimer, écrire et vivre constituent "un même combat", et si dire l'amour n'est pas aimer, comment écrire la vie serait-il vivre? Et que pourrait bien signifier la proposition "Je n'aime pas ce livre"? (shrink)

The Article critically examines the adaptation of citizenship rights to industrial relations and labor law. Starting with T.H. Marshall’s discussion of industrial citizenship, the Article examines the coupling of industrial citizenship with trade unions. While Marshall’s concept of industrial citizenship may seem to be in decline, other labor market institutions are trying to bridge the divide between citizenship and labor rights: workplace democracy, which assumes the constituency of workers in the corporation; and corporate citizenship, which is used to entrust corporations (...) with obligations that are traditionally expected of human citizens. Citizenship’s contribution to the analysis of labor market institutions lies in the emphasis on the public nature of workers’ rights, in the association of rights with obligations, and in the emphasis on active participation. However, citizenship also has "blind spots" that other theories address more coherently. Human rights are a preferred concept for distinguishing fundamental rights from "ordinary" rights. Labor rights are more effective in identifying power structures that citizenship rights may overlook. Consequently, the concept of citizenship may compromise workers’ capacity to negotiate fair remuneration, protection from dismissal and the dignity of labor. (shrink)

Mackie drew attention to the distinct semantic and metaphysical claims made by metaethical realists, arguing that although our evaluative discourse is cognitive and objective, there are no objective evaluative facts. This distinction, however, also opens up a reverse possibility: that our evaluative discourse is antirealist, yet objective values do exist. I suggest that this seemingly farfetched possibility merits serious attention; realism seems committed to its intelligibility, and, despite appearances, it isn‘t incoherent, ineffable, inherently implausible or impossible to defend. I argue (...) that reflection on this possibility should lead us to revise our understanding of the debate between realists and antirealists. It is not only that the realist‘s semantic claim is insufficient for realism to be true, as Mackie argued; it‘s not even necessary. Robust metaethical realism is best understood as making a purely metaphysical claim. It is thus not enough for antirealists to show that our discourse is antirealist. They must directly attack the realist‘s metaphysical claim. (shrink)

La nouvelle rhétorique de Perelman identifie plusieurs types d'auditoires, dont l'auditoire spécialisé (un groupe de physiciens, les adeptes d'une religion) et l'auditoire universel ("l'ensemble de ceux qui sont considérés comme des hommes raisonnables et compétents en la matière"). Ce dernier se distingue des autres par son caractère fictif, car il est une construction mentale de l'orateur. Il pourrait donc reposer sur une pétition de principe, c'est-à-dire sur une ou des prémisses que l'on suppose admises alors qu'elles ne le sont pas. (...) L'examen de cette question est d'autant plus crucial que, pour Perelman, c'est le recours à ce type d'auditoire qui caractérise le discours philosophique. (shrink)

The scientific worldview is often claimed to reveal a universe chillingly indifferent to human suffering. But it’s unclear what it means to describe the universe as indifferent, or what a non- indifferent universe would be like. I suggest that the relevant contrast isn’t simply that between God and His absence, nor is the complaint about indifference focused on the lack of a kind of cosmic concern. At its heart is the idea of a mismatch between world and value. Although the (...) causal forces governing our world are ‘blind’, they nevertheless do partly align with value. Still, our world is so arranged that senseless suffering is depressingly common, and the rosy non- indifferent counterfactual won’t contain such evil. I argue, however, that it is a mistake to long for such an alternative: it must either involve an upside- down moral order, or would be a world from which we, and those who senselessly suffer, will be absent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OSCAR WILDE AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM by Guy Willoughby Towards the beginning ofthe hugely entertaining and provocative manifesto called "The Critic as Artist" (1890),1 Oscar Wilde causes the well-named discipulus Ernest to inquire of the suave magister, Gilbert: "But what are the two supreme and highest arts?" The prompt answer takes us to the heart ofWilde's aesthetic priorities: "Life and Literature," says Gilbert: "Life and the perfect expression of life" (p. (...) 1016). The aim of this discussion is, first, to consider the terms of Oscar Wilde's aesthetics; second, to relate them to tendencies in contemporary theory. I will be arguing, in sum, that the ideas entertained in his essays, and demonstrated in his fictions, have suggestive implications for our practices today—particularly in die light of a gathering rapprochement across the range of cultural study. The abiding theme ofOscar Wilde's writings is his insistence throughout not merely on art's primacy, but on the vital importance ofaesthetic criteria to life itself. In de Profundü (1897), that extraordinary attempt at self-definition, the author claims that it is only by conceiving of one's existence as an art-statement, as a dynamic convergence of forces extending in time and place, that trial, humiliation, and reversal—the shocks the flesh is heir to—can be imaginatively subsumed into a composite whole. He summed up the argument of the apologia thus to André Gide: "My life is like a work of art; an artist never starts the 316 Guy Willoughby317 same thing twice... or if he does, it's that he hasn't succeeded. My life before prison was as successful as possible. Now it's something that's over."2 Accordingly, he ascribes in de Profundis the greatest value to the frank acceptance of all one's deeds and susceptibilities, no matter how vicious or unlovely: "to reject one's experiences is to arrest one's development," he writes. "Whatever is realised is right" (p. 916). It is noteworthy, furthermore, that Wilde oudines this same argument under varying conditions throughout his work as essayist, story-teller, and playwright. In his wry but delicately tuned fairy tales, the most successful heroes and heroines are those who—like the litde Nightingale, the young King, or the Star-Child—manage to transform their lives into images of complex, artistic unity, suggestive of the radical power of the imagination. As the author ofde Profundis was to remark: "every work of art is the conversion of an idea into an image. Every single human being should be the fulfilment of a prophecy" (p. 928). Likewise, the elegant rhetorical strategies of Wilde's two critical dialogues announce art's power to starde and provoke its spectators into new attitudes, and—in particular—to suggest a transference ofaesthetic criteria to life itself. Artistic appreciation develops "that sense of form which is the basis of creative no less than of critical achievement," which may then be profitably applied to one's disparate experience: "it is form that creates not merely the critical temperament, but also the aesthetic instinct, that unerring instinct that reveals to one all things under their conditions of beauty" ("The Critic as Artist," p. 1052). It is only by cultivating a flexible, formalist oudook that a cramping and static Weltanschauung may be avoided; ethical distinctions too must be recast, if a successful life-as-artwork is to be sustained. Thus, writes Wilde, "Ethics, like natural selection, makes existence possible. Aesthetics, like sexual selection, makes life lovely and wonderful, fills it with new forms, and gives it progress, variety and change" (p. 1058). Moreover, the critical or aesthetic impulse—and the point of Wilde's essay is that the terms are interchangeable—has overall a vital cosmopolitan function; it will heal all human divisions, "by insisting on the unity of the human mind in the variety of its forms" (p. 1057). If we transfer aesthetic criteria from art to life, therefore, we will discover a new raison d'être in a skeptical age; we will understand that our apprehension of symmetry in art offers a motive for restoring a novel order to our own lives, singly and together. So it will be that "form [will... (shrink)

Many atheists argue that because gratuitous evil exists, God (probably) doesn’t. But doesn’t this commit atheists to wishing that God did exist, and to the pro-theist view that the world would have been better had God existed? This doesn’t follow. I argue that if all that evil still remains but is just no longer gratuitous, then, from an atheist perspective, that wouldn’t have been better. And while a counterfactual from which that evil is literally absent would have been impersonally better, (...) it wouldn’t have been better for anyone, not even for those who suffered such evils. (shrink)

Quand tu es seul, debout au milieu de la haute plaine d'Asie,sous la coupole insondable où parfois un piloteou un ange sème dans l'azur une coulée d'amidon;quand tu tressailles sentant ta petitesse,apprends-le: l'espace auquel semble-t-il il ne fautrien, a grandement besoin en réalitéd'un regard extérieur, de distance, de vide.Tu es seid à pouvoir lui rendre ce service.Joseph BrodskyIn the course of this century, a number of authors have asserted that geographic knowledge is useful for the development of programs to parcel (...) out land. Hoping to foster this link between insight and action, applied geography saw the light of day. In order to be genuinely effective, the practice of this kind of planning, so it was thought, needed to rely on the expertise of the geographer who studied forms of human settlement. More fundamentally, the utilitarian claim of applied geography rested on the conviction according to which the spatial organization of human societies brought into play the question of justice and commonweal. As Jean Gottmann wrote, our epoch is particularly sensitive to the fact that everyone, whoever or from wherever they may be, consider themselves “to be entitled to live just as well as all others.” In this way a “popular will” was affirmed “that the necessary measures be taken to envisage, prepare, and provide for an improvement of life's comforts …, for a better life.” Inspired by the “modern idea of planning,” applied geography set itself the goal of “establishing justice […] by a more even distribution of people, of their means of subsistence, [and] of their living standard.”. (shrink)

This chapter sharpens the book’s criticism of exclusivist responsible to religious multiplicity, firstly through close critical attention to arguments which religious exclusivists provide, and secondly through the introduction of several new, formal arguments / dilemmas. Self-described ‘post-liberals’ like Paul Griffiths bid philosophers to accept exclusivist attitudes and beliefs as just one among other aspects of religious identity. They bid us to normalize the discourse Griffiths refers to as “polemical apologetics,” and to view its acceptance as the only viable form of (...) pluralism. This reasoning may seem initially plausible, but on closer examination his and other’s defence of the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity fall apart. Informed by our study of luck-leaning theological explanations of religious difference and the counter-inductive thinking they exemplify, I argue that exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are best explained by personal and group bias, and that a discourse between exclusivist authors or sects is beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement. Our study of descriptive (psychological) and prescriptive (religious) fideism in the first sections of Chapter Five suggests that we turn back to formal features of doxastic methods (i.e., of how people process), features that may be straightforwardly tested for in studies utilizing scales of religious orientation. These formal features allow us to better recognize not only the multiplicity of models of faith that religious adherents adhere to, but also that the relationship between forms of fideism is scalar: there is a spectrum of views running from rationalism to fideism, and at the fideistic end from moderate to strong forms of religious fideism. I further explain why developing tests and markers for a high degree of fideistic orientation is important to all those who study religion. The second half of the chapter turns to criticism or censure of exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, in contrast to apologetic defenses of exclusivism. While we have examined the close connections between fideism and fundamentalism, and again between fundamentalism and exclusivism in earlier chapters, a sharper focus reveals an important but little-recognized distinction reflected in the literature: the distinction between religion-specific (or particularist) and mutualist exclusivism. The mutualist doesn’t talk just about the right of adherents of one specific religion to assert exclusivism, but the adherents of any and all “home” religions. I argue that some previously unrecognized problems for the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are brought to light when we make the distinction between the two basic ways to understand the claim that exclusivists are making. I put particularist (Barth, Lindbeck, Plantinga) and mutualist (Griffiths, Gellman, Margalit, D’Costa) defenses of exclusivism on the horns of a dilemma, and argue that despite the popularity it presently enjoys among post-liberal theologians, a close examination reveals that the very conceptual coherence of mutualist exclusivism is in serious doubt. (shrink)

Mon corps est-il un objet parmi d'autres dans l'espace ou bien crée-t-il l'étendue qu'il perçoit jusqu'à l'écho des étoiles? À quelle spatialité suis-je assujetti pour être relié de l'intérieur au monde et aux autres corps qui m'entourent? Les dimensions de l'espace sont-elles des coordonnées de la matière morte ou sont-elles des variations modales de mon esprit? C'est à la découverte de la spatialité du corps vivant que nous invite Guy-Félix Duportail dans son Analytique de la chair. il nous apprend, entre (...) autres, que la phénoménologie et la psychanalyse se rencontrent en ces lieux de la chair suivant des principes topologiques communs. Guy-Félix Duportail dessine le schéma intérieur de la subjectivité comme se donnant à l'extérieur, dans le monde. La subjectivité incarnée se retourne comme un gant et se retrouve ainsi exposée au-dehors, dans son sinthome, comme disait Lacan, dans son implexe, comme disait Merleau-Ponty. Dans tous les cas, elle se réalise dans une création réparatrice de son mal-être. L'immanence est donc dans la transcendance, et l'espace-temps se réfléchit dans la chair, dans les tourbillons de sa jouissance. La présente Analytique de la chair révèle qu'un corps sans organes (Deleuze et Guattari) est certes moins qu'un noeud, mais demeure plus qu'un emmêlement, et qu'une chair sublime mais sans corps (Levinas, Henry) ne fait du visage qu'un masque, et de la Vie glorieuse du Moi qu'un éloge de la pulsion de mort. (shrink)